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Abstract
We show that the allocation of ownership matters even in long-term
relationships where problems of opportunism are less severe unless the
agents are very patient. Ownership structure is chosen to give agents
the best incentives to cooperate. The optimal ownership structure of
the static game restricts the gain from deviation to be the lowest but
also the punishment will be minimal. The worst ownership structure
of the one-shot game is good in the repeated setting because it pro-
vides the highest punishment but bad because the gain from deviation
is also the highest. We show that when investment is inelastic to sur-
plus share joint ownership is optimal. While for elastic investment the
results of the one-shot game apply. Allowing for renegotiation of own-
ership softens the punishment under joint ownership. Joint ownership
is then optimal if the agents are indispensable enough to each other.
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11 Introduction
The property rights theory of the ￿rm (Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990)) is based on agents￿ opportunistic behaviour - self-
interest seeking with guile in Williamson￿s (1985) terminology. Ownership
gives power and allows the owner to expropriate value from the employees
in bargaining. This gives the owner good incentives to invest in ￿rm-speci￿c
human capital while the employees are subject to a greater holdup problem.1
However, the behaviour we observe in the real world is not always opportunis-
tic: workers are loyal to their employers, ￿rms oﬀer good quality products
to their customers etc. Macaulay (1963) ￿nds in his survey on contractual
relations in business that:
Businessmen often prefer to rely on ￿a man￿s word￿ in a brief let-
ter, a handshake, or ￿common honesty and decency￿ - even when
the transaction involves exposure to serious risks.
This kind of behaviour can be explained by reputation concerns. When
the one-shot gain from opportunistic behaviour is outweighed by the loss of
trust in the future holdup problems should not arise. The situations that
involve ￿rm-speci￿c investments are exactly the ones where we would expect
long term relationships to predominate and where reputation eﬀects should
matter. Can we avoid holdup problems under any ownership structure? Is
there any scope for allocation of ownership in a repeated relationship? These
are the issues raised in this paper. A repeated game is a natural way to
analyse reputation eﬀects.
We show that the allocation of ownership indeed matters even in a re-
peated relationship unless the agents are very patient. We have two types of
results: one where joint ownership is optimal and second where the ￿rm has
as i n g l eo w n e r .
Joint ownership is suboptimal in the basic property rights model (Hart
and Moore (1990)) while in our model it can be optimal. In the real world we
observe joint ownership, particularly in the form of joint ventures, which are
quite common. Joint ownership can be optimal if the parties make invest-
ments in physical capital (Hart (1995)) or if it is important to ensure that
1See Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) and Holmstrom (1999) for a useful discussion on
the property rights theory.
2parties invest inside the relationship rather than outside (Rajan and Zingales
(1998)). Joint ownership can also arise if a diﬀerent bargaining solution is
applied (de Meza and Lockwood (1998)). Reputation eﬀects analysed in this
paper can further contribute to our understanding of joint ownership.
The property rights theory of the ￿rm analyses how holdup problems in
￿rm-speci￿c human capital can be minimized by appropriate allocation of
ownership. Ownership gives power to an agent in the sense that the outside
option is increased. If an agent owns an additional asset she can generate
a higher value on her own. This higher outside option means that she can
secure a higher share of the surplus in bargaining and therefore she has
improved incentives to invest. Giving power to an agent means that we are
taking power away from someone else - and that someone else has lower
incentives. What the property rights theory is about is allocating power so
that joint surplus is maximized.
Joint ownership does not give power to anybody. If two agents jointly
own an asset, they have to reach a unanimous decision on the use of the asset.
If they fail to reach an agreement, they cannot use the asset. Therefore the
outside options are zero and the holdup problems are maximal in the static
Hart and Moore model. It is better to give power to somebody rather than
to give power to nobody. Therefore having a single owner dominates joint
ownership in the static model.
In the repeated game the ownership structure is chosen to give the agents
best incentives to cooperate. The best ownership structure is such that the
gain from cheating is lowest relative to the punishment. The worst ownership
structure of the one-shot game (joint ownership) has the advantage in the
repeated game that it provides the highest punishment; the joint surplus
is the lowest in the punishment path. However, the highest punishment
does not imply that cooperation would be most sustainable. It is also true
that when the punishment is highest so is the gain from deviation. When
there are no outside options the bargaining will result in an even split of
the surplus; the deviant gets half of the surplus generated by the opponent￿s
￿rst-best investment and gains a lot from deviation. While when the agents
have outside options then the deviant cannot extract as much as half of the
value of the eﬃcient investment in bargaining and therefore gains less from
cheating.
The trade-oﬀ present in the repeated game is the following. Joint own-
ership is good because it provides the highest punishment but bad because
3the gain from cheating is also the highest. Single ownership restricts the gain
from deviation to be the lowest but also the punishment will be minimal.
When the investment is inelastic to surplus share it is optimal to ensure
that punishment is maximal: joint ownership arises in equilibrium. While for
elastic investment emphasis is on minimizing the gain from deviation; it is
optimal for the ￿rm to have a single owner. When we allow for renegotiation
of ownership structure the punishment is softer under joint ownership. Then
in addition to inelastic investment the agents have to be indispensable enough
to each other for joint ownership to be optimal.
In related papers Klein and Leﬄer (1981), Telser (1981) and Bull (1987)
show how cooperative agreements can be self-enforcing in a variety of sit-
uations. Their analysis relies on implicit contracts while in our model the
interaction of implicit and explicit contracts is crucial. In Garvey (1995)
reputation eﬀects lead to a more equal sharing rule and the sharing rule
is interpreted as the ownership structure. In our paper a range of sharing
rules, equal and unequal ones, can implement ￿r s tb e s tw h i l et h ed e ￿nition
of ownership is who has the residual control rights over the assets. Baker et
al. (2000), subsequent to this paper, also analyse reputation eﬀects in the
theory of the ￿rm. Our papers are complementary as we analyse a diﬀerent
environment. Their environment is asymmetric in the sense that only one
party has an investment. They do not analyse joint ownership which is more
natural in our symmetric environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A numerical example is
presented in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 brie￿y
discusses the results of the one-shot game. The repeated game without rene-
gotiation is analysed in Section 5. In Section 6 we allow for renegotiation of
ownership structure. Section 7 concludes.
2A n e x a m p l e
We start with a simple numerical example. There is one asset, a,a n dt w o
agents, 1 and 2. Ex ante agent 1 makes an investment in speci￿ch u m a n
capital. The investment can take three values: 0, 150, or 300. The cost of
the investment is 0, 90, or 40γ respectively where 5 < γ < 6. Accordingly
4the highest investment, 300, maximizes the joint surplus.2 Asset a is essen-
tial to agent 1: her investment has no value unless she has access to the
asset. Agent 2 does not have an investment but he is important as a trading
partner: without his contribution agent 1 can realize only 1
3 of the value of
her investment (that is, either 0, 50, or 100). Due to high transaction costs
ex ante contracts can be written only on the allocation of ownership. We
compare two ownership structures: joint ownership and agent 1 control. In
ex post bargaining the agents split the diﬀerence.
Under joint ownership the agents have to reach a unanimous agreement
on the use of the asset. Therefore in the one-shot game agent 1 receives
only half of the value of her investment which does not cover its cost (both
1
2150 < 90 and 1
2300 < 40γ). 1 will not invest and the joint surplus is equal to
zero. When agent 1 owns the asset she receives 2
3 of the value (2
3 = 1
2(1+ 1
3)).
Then 1 will choose the medium investment, 150, since 2
3150 > 90 and 2
3300
< 40γ. The joint surplus is equal to 60 and 1￿s share of it is equal to 10. The
prediction of the one-shot game is that the only investing agent should own
the asset.
When the trading relationship is repeated rather than one-shot the agents
may support ￿rst best by the following trigger strategy. Agent 1 implicitly
agrees to make the ￿rst-best investment and agent 2 in turn agrees to pay
at r a n s f e rT to agent 1. Any deviations will trigger the outcome of the
one-shot game as punishment: splitting the diﬀerence in bargaining and
underinvestment by agent 1. Under joint ownership it may also be necessary
to renegotiate the ownership structure.
When agent 1 owns the asset she does not cheat if and only if the dis-
counted payoﬀ stream from the eﬃcient behaviour exceeds the payoﬀ stream
from the deviation path:
1
1 − δ
(T − 40γ) ≥ 10 +
δ
1 − δ
10 (1)
In the eﬃcient path agent 1 receives T and pays her investment cost 40γ.
The only way agent 2 can punish is by not paying the promised transfer
but instead split the diﬀerence. If 1 cheats in investment, 2 observes it and
starts the punishment already in the second half of the same period. Agent
2The assumption γ < 6 guarantees that the highest investment is eﬃcient and γ > 5i s
required for the costs to be convex.
51 chooses the deviation investment taking into account that the surplus will
be divided by the split-the-diﬀerence rule. Therefore the cheating investment
and the payoﬀ from cheating equal their levels in the one-shot game. That
is, by cheating agent 1 obtains 10 in every period. This explains agent 1￿s
incentive compatibility constraint (1) which simpli￿es to:
T − 40γ ≥ 10 (2)
While agent 2 will not cheat if and only if:
1
1 − δ
(300 − T) ≥ 100 +
δ
1 − δ
50 (3)
In the eﬃcient path agent 2 pays T and receives the rest of the surplus.
However, by refusing to pay the promised transfer to agent 1 he can extract
more surplus. In fact, he can obtain 1
3 of the value of 1￿s investment, that is
100. But if 2 cheats in this period, from next period on 1 will underinvest
and 2 receives a payoﬀ of 50
‡
= 1
3150
·
. The higher is T the less likely it is
that (3) holds. Therefore to guarantee the best incentives for cooperation we
choose T s u c ht h a t( 2 )j u s th o l d s ,t h a ti sT =4 0 γ +10 . Inserting this in (3)
and simplifying we obtain:
δ ≥
40γ − 190
50
. (4)
Agent 1 ownership implements ￿r s tb e s ti fa n do n l yi f( 4 )h o l d s .
Joint ownership is a dominated structure in the static game and there-
fore in analysing the repeated game we have to take into account that the
ownership structure can be renegotiated after deviation. We assume that in
bargaining they split the diﬀerence and that there is a renegotiation cost σ
(which is for simplicity expressed as a cost per period). Renegotiation raises
the joint surplus in the punishment path from zero to 60 and accordingly
renegotiation pays for σ < 60. The agents will cooperate if and only if:
1
1 − δ
(T − 40γ) ≥ 0+
δ
1 − δ
1
2
(60 − σ)( 5 )
1
1 − δ
(300 − T) ≥ 150 +
δ
1 − δ
1
2
(60 − σ)( 6 )
6Again agent 1￿s deviation payoﬀ is equal to her payoﬀ in the one-shot game,
that is zero. While agent 2 can extract half of 1￿s ￿rst best investment by
cheating, that is 150
‡
= 1
2300
·
. In the punishment path without renegotia-
tion each agent would get a zero payoﬀ. Splitting the gains from renegotiating
to agent 1 ownership gives per period payoﬀ 1
2 (60 − σ) to each agent.
We choose T such that (5) just binds, that is:
T =4 0 γ +
1
2
δ (60 − σ)( 7 )
Inserting (7) in (6) and simplifying gives:
δ ≥
40γ − 150
90 + σ
. (8)
If ownership structure is not renegotiated (which is optimal when σ ≥ 60)
the incentive compatibility constraints are like (5) and (6) except that the
last term in both equations is replaced by zero. Then we choose T =4 0 γ
so that agent 1￿s IC just binds. Inserting this transfer in agent 2￿s IC and
simplifying gives:
δ ≥
40γ − 150
150
(9)
We are now ready to determine the optimal ownership structure which
is the structure that implements ￿rst best for the greatest range of discount
factors. For σ < 60 joint ownership is optimal if and only if the right-hand-
side of (8) is smaller than the right-hand-side of (4), that is if and only
if:
γ >
19σ + 960
4σ +1 6 0
. (10)
When σ ≥ 60 joint ownership is optimal if and only if the right-hand-side
of (9) is smaller than the right-hand-side of (4), that is if and only if γ >
51
4. Accordingly, joint ownership - the worst structure of the static game -
implements ￿rst best for a greater range of discount factors than agent 1
control iﬀ γ is high enough.
We assumed that 5 < γ < 6. We now have to check that the right-hand-
side of (10) is within this range. For σ = 0 it is equal to 6, for σ =6 0i t
7is 51
4, 3 and it is monotonically decreasing in σ. Therefore for σ and γ high
enough joint ownership is optimal in the repeated game.
To understand this result we have constructed Table 1 which gives the
gain (G)a n dt h el o s s( L) from deviation under the two structures. The gain
shows how much more agent 2 can obtain by cheating than by cooperating4
while the loss describes how much lower the payoﬀ is in the punishment path
relative to cooperation.
joint ownership agent 1 control
G 40γ − 150 40γ − 190
L, σ < 60 240 − 40γ + σ 240 − 40γ
L, σ ≥ 60 300 − 40γ 240 − 40γ
Table 1
The best ownership structure is such that the gain from cheating is lowest
relative to the loss. We can see from Table 1 that joint ownership implements
a higher loss for the cheater but the gain from deviation is higher too. The
loss is greater since the investment drops to zero rather than 150 in the no
renegotiation case. When joint ownership is renegotiated in the punishment
path the joint surplus drops to 60 as under agent 1 ownership but it is the
renegotiation cost that makes the loss higher under joint ownership. The
gain is greater under joint ownership since agent 2 can extract half rather
than 1
3 of the value of 1￿s eﬃcient investment.
How does γ aﬀect the incentives to cooperate? It is easy to see from
Table 1 that the gain from deviation is increasing in γ.W h e nt h e￿rst-best
investment becomes more expensive (γ increases) agent 2 has to pay a higher
transfer to agent 1 to implement eﬃcient investment. Since the value of the
investment has not changed 2￿s payoﬀ is now lower under cooperation. On
the other hand 2￿s deviation payoﬀ is unchanged since it is not related to
investment costs. Therefore the gain from deviation is higher. Table 1 also
shows that the loss from deviation is decreasing in γ. The drop in surplus
3Note that there is no jump in the critical value for γ when we move from renegotiation
range to the range where renegotiation does not take place. When there is no renegotiation
the critical value is 51
4 and with renegotiation and σ =6 0i ti s5 1
4.
4Remember T was chosen so that agent 1￿s IC binds. Therefore in discussion we can
concentrate on agent 2￿s incentives.
8after deviation is smaller when the eﬃcient surplus is not very high in the
￿rst place.
Since the best ownership structure is such that the gain from cheating is
lowest relative to the loss joint ownership is optimal if moving from agent 1
control to joint ownership increases the punishment relatively more than the
gain from deviation. In this example the relative increase in the punishment is
60/(240-40γ)o rσ/(240-40γ) while the relative increase in the gain is 40/(40γ
-190). When γ is high the gain is high and the punishment is low. Therefore
it is easier to obtain a higher relative change in the punishment. (Note that
the absolute changes do not in fact depend on γ.) Then joint ownership
which maximizes punishment is optimal. When γ is low the opposite is true:
the gain is low and the punishment is high. Then it is optimal to put all
the weight in minimizing the gain since higher relative changes are easier to
obtain there and agent 1 control is optimal.
In the rest of the paper we verify the result of this example in a model
where both agents have a continuous investment.
3 The model
Our stage game is a simpli￿ed version of Hart and Moore (1990). We analyse
a setup where agents 1 and 2 use asset a to supply consumers. Ex ante each
agent makes an investment in human capital which is speci￿ct oa s s e ta.W e
model the investment as agent i directly choosing the value of the investment,
vi. The investment makes the agent more productive in using the asset. The
agent for example learns to know better the properties of the asset or the
environment the ￿rm operates and can therefore generate more surplus. The
cost of the investment to agent i is c(vi). We make the following assumptions
about the cost of investment:
Assumption 1. vi ∈ [0,V] where V> 0.c (vi) ≥ 0 and c(0) = 0.cis twice
diﬀerentiable. c0(vi) > 0 and c￿(vi) > 0 for vi ∈ (0,V), with limvi→0 c0(vi)=
0 and limvi→V c0(vi)=∞. .
Investment in human capital is assumed to be too complex to be de-
scribed adequately in a contract. It is observable to both agents but not
veri￿able to third parties like the court. Therefore the agents choose the
9investments noncooperatively. We also rule out pro￿t-sharing agreements.5
Ex ante contracts can only be written on the allocation of ownership. The
possible ownership structures are agent 1 ownership, agent 2 ownership and
joint ownership.
Outside options play a key role in the analysis. Under agent i ownership
ican work alone with the asset after the investments are sunk and sell the ￿nal
good to the customers. The value of the trade without agent j￿s contribution
is λvi where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. The value of λ depends on the importance of agent
j as a trading partner. If agent j is indispensable to asset a so that giving
the control of a to agent i does not enhance the surplus he can generate on
his own, then λ =0 .I fa g e n tj is dispensable so that agent i could replace
him by an outsider without loss of value, then λ =1 .W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
agents are equally important as trading partners (have identical λ0s).
When an agent does not control any asset on her own she has an outside
option to work for another ￿r m . W ea s s u m et h a ta s s e ta is essential to
the agents so that the outside wage does not depend on their investment.
Without loss of generality we normalize this ￿xed wage to zero.
Ex post the uncertainty is resolved and the agents negotiate a spot con-
tract. The investments are observable to both agents at the time of bargain-
ing and therefore the eﬃcient bargaining solution will be reached. The only
source of ineﬃciency in this model arises from the possible underinvestment.
Consistent with Hart and Moore (1990) we assume that in bargaining the
agents split the diﬀerence. Finally, production occurs and the ￿nal good is
sold to the customers.
In our dynamic model the stage game described above is repeated in￿-
nitely. At date 0 the agents write a contract on the allocation of ownership
to maximize the joint surplus. The contract can give the ownership of the
asset to the same agent(s) for all the game or induce changes in ownership.
Given our assumptions about contractibility the only event this contract can
be contingent on is time. Skills depreciate and the environment changes
and further investments can be made in the beginning of each period. We
make the extreme assumption that the investment depreciates fully before
the next period begins. In the second half of the period the gains from trade
are realized and the spot contract on the division of surplus is written.
5See Hart and Moore (1990) for the justi￿cation of these assumptions.
10The agents can renegotiate the date 0 contract on ownership structure.
This becomes relevant after deviation from ￿rst best. We assume that there
is a renegotiation cost σ. Transaction costs from ownership changes are not
negligible, especially when we refer to renegotiation after trust has been
breached.
4 One-shot game
In this section we brie￿y examine the static game. Equation (11) gives the
￿rst best investments, v∗
i:
1 − c
0(v
∗
i)=0 i =1 ,2 (11)
We simplify notation by writing v∗
i ≡ v∗ and denote the ￿r s tb e s tj o i n t
surplus by S∗ where S∗ =2 [ v∗ − c(v∗)]. Since ex ante contracts on trade
cannot be written, the bargaining takes place after the investments are sunk.
Agent i foresees that part of the surplus she generates by her investment is
expropriated in ex post bargaining while she pays the full cost of investment.
Therefore underinvestment (holdup) typically arises. Ownership is allocated
to induce the highest investment.
Under joint ownership agent i can realize the value of her investment
only by reaching an agreement with agent j; her investment has no value if
she does not have access to her essential asset. The agents have to reach a
unanimous agreement to use the asset. Since both agents have zero outside
options they split the surplus 50:50 and the payoﬀs for the agents are:
Pi =
1
2
(v1 + v2) − c(vi) i =1 ,2 (12)
Therefore agent i receives only half of the value of her investment at the
margin and the investments, vJ
1 and vJ
2, are given by:
1
2
− c
0(v
J
i )=0 i =1 ,2 (13)
We simplify notation by writing vJ
i ≡ vJ and denote the joint surplus by SJ.
11With a single owner, say agent 1,6 the payoﬀs for the agents are:
P1 = λv1 +
1
2
[(1 − λ)v1 + v2] − c(v1) (14)
P2 =
1
2
[(1 − λ)v1 + v2] − c(v2) (15)
The investments, v1
1 and v1
2, are given by the following ￿rst-order conditions:
1
2
(1 + λ) − c
0(v
1
1) = 0 (16)
1
2
− c
0(v
1
2) = 0 (17)
The owner￿s investment is the greater the more dispensable the worker is (the
higher is λ) while the worker￿s investment does not depend on λ.D e n o t et h e
joint surplus by S1.
In this setup the ownership decision is very simple. It is easy to see from
(13), (16) and (17) that joint ownership is strictly dominated for any λ > 0.
Under joint ownership no agent has an outside option, while when there is a
single owner, the owner has a positive outside option and therefore improved
incentives to invest. Hart and Moore (1990) obtain the same result in a more
general setup.
5 Repeated game without renegotiation
When the agents are in a long term relationship and care about the future,
the holdup problems described in the previous section should not be so severe.
In this section we analyse when the eﬃcient investments can be supported
using the trigger strategy and reversion to the Nash equilibrium of the static
game as punishment. Obviously if the agents are very patient (the discount
factor is close to one) the ￿rst best can be supported under any ownership
structure. We are interested in situations when the agents are not completely
patient and our aim is to ￿nd an ownership structure that guarantees ￿rst
best for the greatest range of discount factors. The focus of this section is on
6Since the agents are identical agent 2 ownership would give the same joint surplus as
agent 1 ownership.
12high renegotiation costs (σ >> 0) so that the ownership structure will not
be renegotiated. Section 6 examines lower values for σ.
The agents implicitly agree to make the eﬃcient investments and share the
surplus according to (P∗
1,P∗
2). (The sharing rule will be determined later.)
Deviation from either investment or sharing rule will trigger punishment
from the opponent for the rest of the game. In particular, if agent i cheats
in investment the cooperation breaks down already in the second half of the
day7: the surplus will be divided as in the static game, not according to the
eﬃcient sharing rule. Also if there is no deviation in investment but an agent
does not agree to follow the sharing rule (P∗
1,P∗
2), then bargaining will result
in the split-the-diﬀerence rule.
The trigger strategy for agent i is:
￿ in period 1 choose v∗ and follow (P∗
1,P∗
2)
￿ if (P∗
1,P∗
2)a n dvj = v∗ in 1,2,...,t-1, then choose v∗ and follow (P ∗
1,P∗
2)
in t
￿ if either vj 6= v∗ in t or not (P∗
1,P∗
2)i nt-1 or t, then apply (PN
1 ,PN
2 )
in t,t+1,... and choose vN in t +1 ,t+2 ,... where superscript N refers
to the Nash equilibrium of the static game
Note that the only relevant information about the previous period when
a new period begins is whether there was or was not deviation. Whether the
deviation was in the investment or the sharing rule does not matter. This
also means that the extensive form and the outcome of the bargaining game
for the static model (as proposed in Sutton (1986)) is appropriate also here
for the punishment phase. Whether the agents reach an agreement or fail to
do so and have to take the outside option this period does not change the
rest of the game. The next period starts from the same node.
It is easy to see that cheating in the investment dominates cheating in
the sharing rule. When agent i deviates in the investment, she chooses her
investment taking into account that the surplus will be divided with the split-
the-diﬀerence rule. (The deviation investment is thus equal to the investment
7Note that by cooperation we refer to eﬃcient behaviour: ￿rst-best investments and
sharing rule. Of course this is a noncooperative game. Note also that even during pun-
ishment the agents get together and make the deal but the investments are lower and the
division of surplus is diﬀerent.
13in the one-shot game.) By de￿nition this is more than making the ￿rst-best
investment and then switching to the split-the-diﬀerence rule. Only when
agent i does not have an incentive to cheat in the investment (she has ￿rst-
best incentives even in the one-shot game) might she choose to deviate in
the sharing rule.
First best will be supported in equilibrium if and only if the discounted
payoﬀ stream from eﬃcient behaviour exceeds the payoﬀ stream from the
deviation path for both agents. Equations (18) and (19) give the incentive
compatibility constraints for the agents.
1
1 − δ
[T − c(v
∗)] ≥ P
d
1 +
δ
1 − δ
P
p
1 (18)
1
1 − δ
[2v
∗ − T − c(v
∗)] ≥ P
d
2 +
δ
1 − δ
P
p
2 (19)
where δ is the discount factor, T is the transfer agent 1 receives from 2
under cooperation, P d
i is i￿s one-shot deviation payoﬀ and P
p
i is i￿s payoﬀ in
the punishment path. If agent 1 deviates in investment, agent 2 observes it
already in the same period and he will not pay T to agent 1. Agent 1 saves in
investment costs but receives now a share of the surplus that is determined
by Nash bargaining. The deviation payoﬀs with the single owner are:
P
d
1 =
1
2
(1 + λ)v
1
1 +
1
2
v
∗ − c
‡
v
1
1
·
(20)
P
d
2 =
1
2
(1 − λ)v
∗ +
1
2
v
1
2 − c
‡
v
1
2
·
(21)
while under joint ownership the deviation payoﬀsa r e :
P
d
i =
1
2
v
∗ +
1
2
v
J − c
‡
v
J
·
i =1 ,2 (22)
Proposition 1 designs a sharing rule such that both agents have best
incentives to cooperate.
Proposition 1 The optimal sharing rule is:
P ∗
1 = sP d
1 +( 1− s)(S∗ − Pd
2)
P ∗
2 =( 1− s)Pd
2 + s(S∗ − Pd
1)
where s =( Pd
2 − P
p
2)/(Pd
1 + Pd
2 − P
p
1 − P
p
2) .
14Proof. When agent 2 pays a transfer T to agent 1, the payoﬀsa r e :
P
∗
1 = T − c(v
∗) (23)
P
∗
2 =2 v
∗ − T − c(v
∗) (24)
Then agent 1 will cooperate if and only if:
δ ≥
Pd
1 − T + c(v∗)
P d
1 − P
p
1
(25)
Likewise agent 2 cooperates if and only if:
δ ≥
P d
2 − 2v∗ + T + c(v∗)
P d
2 − P
p
2
(26)
Because agent 2￿s incentive to cooperate is decreasing in T while 1￿s incentive
is increasing in T,t h eo p t i m a lT gives the agents balanced incentives to
cooperate. Setting the right-hand-sides of equations (25) and (26) equal we
can solve for T ∗:
T
∗ =
(Pd
2 − P
p
2)
h
P d
1 + c(v∗)
i
+( Pd
1 − P
p
1)
h
2v∗ − Pd
2 − c(v∗)
i
(P d
1 − P
p
1)+( Pd
2 − P
p
2)
(27)
Inserting T ∗ in equations (23) and (24) gives the expressions in the Proposi-
tion.
Neither agent would have an incentive to deviate if they could get their
deviation payoﬀ even under cooperation. Since this is not feasible the best
we can do is to give each agent a certain proportion of her deviation payoﬀ.
It is like agent 1 gets her deviation payoﬀ with probability s and agent 2 gets
his deviation payoﬀ with probability (1 − s)l e a v i n gt h er e s to ft h es u r p l u s ,
(S∗ − Pd
2), to agent 1. The proportion s is chosen to balance the agents￿
incentives to cooperate.
Inserting the optimal sharing rule of Proposition 1 in (18) or (19) gives
the range of discount factors for which ￿rst best can be supported:
δ ≥
P d
1 + P d
2 − S∗
Pd
1 + Pd
2 − P
p
1 − P
p
2
(28)
15To understand the incentives to cooperate we ￿rstly examine the gain
and the loss from deviation. The gain under agent 1 ownership is:
G
1 =
•1
2
(1 + λ)v
1
1 − c(v
1
1)
‚
−
•1
2
(1 + λ)v
∗ − c(v
∗)
‚
+
•1
2
v
1
2 − c(v
1
2)
‚
−
•1
2
v
∗ − c(v
∗)
‚
(29)
where G ≡
‡
Pd
1 + Pd
2 − S∗
·
. This expression is strictly positive since v1
1
is chosen to maximize the ￿rst term is square brackets and v1
2 is chosen
to maximize the third term in square brackets. The same is true for joint
ownership8 and therefore the agents can gain by cheating; they can extract
more of the value of the other party￿s eﬃcient investment by deviating.
If agent i cheats in investment she gains in this period but from the next
period on the payoﬀ will be lower because agent j punishes by choosing lower
investment. With a single owner the loss from deviation is equal to:
L
1 =2[ v
∗ − c(v
∗)] −
h
v
1
1 − c(v
1
1)
i
−
h
v
1
2 − c(v
1
2)
i
(30)
where L ≡ (S∗ − P
p
1 − P
p
2). The loss is strictly positive since v∗ maximizes
the ￿rst term in square brackets. L shows how much lower the joint surplus
will be in the punishment path. If the agents are patient enough the one-shot
gain from cheating is outweighed by lower payoﬀ in the future. Equation (28)
simpli￿es to:
δ ≥
G
G + L
. (31)
The main focus of this paper is on equation (31). The gain and loss from
deviation will diﬀer in general for diﬀerent ownership structures. De￿ne
δ ≡ G/(G + L). In what follows we concentrate on ￿nding the control
structure that guarantees ￿rst best for the greatest range of discount factors,
that is gives the lowest δ. The best ownership structure is such that the gain
from deviation is lowest relative to the loss. Now it becomes clear that the
optimal allocation gives the ownership to the same agent(s) for all the game.
For example giving ownership of the asset to agent 1 for the ￿rst t periods
8For joint ownership subsitute λ =0a n dv1
1 = v1
2 = vJ.
16and then making agent 2 the owner for the rest of the game does not improve
the incentives to cooperate in any way (it may do no harm either if δ is equal
under both control structures).
Therefore we are left with the question: is δ minimized by removing agent
1￿s outside option (joint ownership) or by giving her an outside option (single
owner)? We can derive the optimal control structure by examining how the
lowerbound for the discount factor with a single owner, δ1(λ), moves with λ.
Examining how λ aﬀects δ1 is like comparing diﬀerent ownership structures.
This is because for λ = 0 all ownership structures are equivalent, which is
stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 δ1(0) = δ
J.
When the agents are indispensable (λ = 0) joint ownership and agent 1
ownership are equivalent since owning the asset does not improve 1￿s incen-
tives to invest in the punishment path. Agent 2 has the maximal holdup
power: agent 1 cannot do anything without agent 2. Then all the ownership
structures are equivalent.
We start by analysing the gain and loss from cheating.
Proposition 2 With a single owner both the gain and loss from deviation
are decreasing in λ.
Proof. Equation (29) gives the gain from deviation under agent 1 owner-
ship. Total diﬀerentiation gives:
dG
1/dλ =
•1
2
(1 + λ) − c
0(v
1
1)
‚
∂v
1
1/∂λ+
1
2
(v
1
1 − v
∗)=
1
2
(v
1
1 − v
∗) < 0 (32)
The investment eﬀect is negligible and therefore we can ignore the ￿rst term
in (32). Accordingly, the gain is decreasing in λ. Equation (30) gives the loss
from deviation under agent 1 ownership. By total diﬀerentiation we obtain:
dL
1/dλ = −
h
1 − c
0(v
1
1)
i
∂v
1
1/∂λ = −
1
2
(1 − λ)∂v
1
1/∂λ < 0 (33)
The ￿rst order condition (16) helps us to determine the sign of this expres-
sion and to simplify it. It is easy to see from (16) that ∂v1
1/∂λ is positive.
Therefore (33) is unambiguously negative.
17A high loss and low gain from deviation would guarantee good incentives
to cooperate. Proposition 2 tells that removing agent 1￿s outside option
(λ = 0) provides the highest loss. In the punishment path agent 1 receives
only half of the value of her investment at the margin and therefore the
punishment investment and the joint surplus are the lowest possible. Single
owner with λ = 0 is like joint ownership which is the worst structure in the
one-shot game. In the repeated game this structure has the advantage that
it provides the highest punishment.
However, the highest punishment does not imply that cooperation would
be most sustainable. Proposition 2 shows that when the punishment is high-
est so is the gain from deviation. When agent 2 deviates in investment the
spot contract will be written with the split-the-diﬀerence rule. When there
are no outside options the agents simply split the gross surplus 50:50; the
deviant gets half of the surplus generated by agent 1￿s ￿rst-best investment
and therefore gains a lot from deviation. While when agent 1 has an outside
option (λ > 0) agent 2 can extract less than half of the value of the eﬃcient
investment and therefore gains less from deviation. The optimal ownership
structure of the one-shot game gives the highest possible outside option and
consequently the highest share of the value of her investment to agent 1 and
therefore best restricts the gain from deviation for agent 2. In the same time
punishment will be minimal because 1￿s incentive to invest in the punishment
path is maximized. The worst structure of the static game is good in the
repeated game because it provides the highest punishment but bad because
the gain from deviation is also the highest.
Proposition 2 tells that the gain and loss from deviation move to the same
direction as we change λ and it is not immediately clear what is the eﬀect
on δ1. The change in δ1 is given by:
∂δ
1
∂λ
s =
| ∂L1/∂λ |
L1 −
| ∂G1/∂λ |
G1 (34)
where
s = denotes that the expressions have the same sign. The sign of (34)
depends on the diﬀerence between the relative changes in the gain and loss.
Both changes are negative and to ease the discussion we have chosen to use
their absolute values. The ￿rst term gives the relative change in the loss
from cheating and the second term is the relative change in the gain. If the
gain decreases relatively more than the punishment then δ1 is decreasing in
λ while when the punishment eﬀect is greater than the gain eﬀect then δ1
18is increasing in λ. Analysing such a diﬀerence is very subtle. Therefore we
introduce an explicit functional form for the investment cost.
Assumption 1’. c(v)=vγ where γ > 1..
Lemma 2 examines the properties of δ1(λ).
Lemma 2 (i) δ
1(0) = δ
1(1) = δJ.
(ii) For 0 < λ < 1 δ1 is

 
 
<
=
>

 
 
δJ if and only if γ

 
 
<
=
>

 
 
2.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Lemma 2 helps us to construct Figure 1. The Figure compares the lower-
bounds for the discount factor under diﬀerent ownership structures for vari-
ous values of the outside option parameter λ.
L e m m a2s h o w st h a tδ1 is nonmonotonic in λ. δ
1(0) = δJ because the
ownership structures are equivalent even in the one-shot game. δ
1(1) = δJ
because for λ = 1 the gain and loss from deviation are aﬀected by only
agent 2￿s investment under single ownership. This investment is equal to
his investment under joint ownership
‡
v1
2 = vJ
·
. Agent 1￿s investment is
not included because agent 2 cannot extract any of agent 1￿s investment in
bargaining as he is dispensable. Neither does agent 1￿s investment provide
any punishment because she has ￿rst best incentives even in the one-shot
game. This explains the nonmonotonicity.
We can determine the optimal ownership structure by examining Figure
1.
Proposition 3 For σ >> 0 joint ownership is optimal if and only if γ > 2.
Proof. It is immediately clear from Figure 1(a) that for γ > 2 δJ ≤ δ1.
When γ is large it becomes important to ensure that the punishment
is maximal. Then joint ownership is optimal. The agents have to reach a
unanimous agreement to use the asset. Otherwise they can work for another
￿rm at a zero wage. Therefore the joint surplus is the lowest possible in the
punishment path and cheating would lead to a very bad equilibrium.
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if γ < 2.
Proof. Now Figure 1(b) where γ < 2 is appropriate. δ
1 ≤ δ
Jas the Figure
illustrates.
Proposition 4 tells that when γ is small, the prediction of the one-shot
game holds. In this parameter range it is more important to ensure that the
gain from deviation is the smallest possible although then also the punish-
ment is minimal. This is guaranteed when the asset has a single owner.
Proposition 5 For σ >> 0 ownership does not matter if (i) λ =0or (ii)
γ =2 .
Proof. (i) Follows straightforward from Lemma 1. (ii)I fγ =2δ is equal
for all ownership structures as Lemma 2 shows.
Proposition 5 gives the only two cases when the ownership structure does
not matter in the repeated game. First, if all ownership structures are equiv-
alent in the static game they will be equivalent in the dynamic game as well.
This is the case when no allocation gives an outside option to agent 1; agent 2
is indispensable. Second, we have a more interesting equivalence result when
the ownership structures diﬀer in the one-shot game but the punishment and
gain eﬀect exactly oﬀset each other. On the knife-edge ownership does not
matter.
Our results depend on the parameter γ. To provide intuition for that
remember that there are two ways to encourage cooperation: restricting the
share of the ￿rst best investment a cheater can get or minimizing the size
of the surplus (or maximizing the drop in surplus) after deviation. Let us
concentrate on the size eﬀe c ta st h es h a r ed o e sn o td e p e n do nγ. The fall in
surplus along the punishment path depends on the elasticity of investment
(v1
1) to surplus share
‡
1
2 (1 + λ)
·
. This elasticity is equal to 1
1−γ, i.e. for γ > 2
(γ < 2) investment is inelastic (elastic) to surplus share. Joint ownership is
optimal if without this ownership structure a deviation would only have little
impact on the surplus generated. For inelastic investment joint ownership is
needed to trigger a big fall in surplus along the punishment path. While for
elastic investment even single ownership provides large enough punishment
which combined with minimal gain from deviation results in best incentives.
206 Repeated game with renegotiation
In this section we allow σ to take any non-negative value and accordingly
allow for the possibility of renegotiation of ownership structure in the pun-
ishment path. We ￿rstly determine the parameter values for which renego-
tiation will take place. Under joint ownership there is renegotiation in the
punishment path if and only if:
S
1 (λ) − σ ≥ S
J. (35)
Equation (35) is satis￿ed for small enough σ and large enough λ.F o rl a r g e
λ the joint surplus is much higher under agent 1 ownership and therefore the
increase in joint surplus is less likely to be outweighed by the renegotiation
cost σ. De￿ne λ so that (35) just binds, that is S1 (λ)=SJ + σ.
Lemma 3 Ownership structure is renegotiated in the punishment path under
joint ownership if and only if λ ≥ λ . λ
0(σ) > 0 and λ(0) = 0.
Proof. The ￿rst part of the Lemma follows directly from the de￿nition of
λ and from ∂S1
∂λ > 0. For σ =0w eh a v eS1 (λ)=SJ which holds for λ =0 .
The higher is σ, the higher λ has to be for S1 (λ)=SJ + σ to hold.
Lemma 3 states that when renegotiation is costless (σ = 0) renegotiation
occurs for all λ. The higher is σ, the smaller is the renegotiation range (the
higher is λ) as the joint surplus has to be high enough with a single owner
for renegotiation to pay.
How do the incentives to cooperate change when we allow for renegoti-
ation? We start by assuming that we are in the renegotiation range and
denote the critical discount factor under joint ownership by e δ
J
.9 After hav-
ing examined the properties of e δ
J
we will take into account the range where
renegotiation does not occur and analyse the optimal ownership structure.
9The analysis with a single owner does not change.
21T h ea g e n t sh a v en oi n c e n t i v et od e v i a t ef r o m￿r s tb e s ti fa n do n l yi f :
1
1 − δ
[T − c(v
∗)] ≥ P
d
1 +
δ
1 − δ
•
P
p
1 +
1
2
‡
S
1 − P
p
1 − P
p
2 − σ
·‚
(36)
1
1 − δ
[2v
∗ − T − c(v
∗)] ≥ P
d
2 +
δ
1 − δ
•
P
p
2 +
1
2
‡
S
1 − P
p
1 − P
p
2 − σ
·‚
(37)
These incentive compatibility constraints diﬀer from (18) and (19) with re-
spect to the last term in square brackets. In the punishment path the own-
ership structure is renegotiated and the agents split the gains from renego-
tiation. Adding up the incentive compatibility constrains10 and simplifying
gives the lowerbound for the discount factor:
δ ≥
Pd
1 + Pd
2 − S∗
P d
1 + P d
2 − S1 + σ
≡ e δ
J
(38)
The gain and loss from deviation under joint ownership are now:
e G
J =2
•1
2
v
J − c
‡
v
J
·‚
− 2
•1
2
v
∗ − c(v
∗)
‚
(39)
e L
J = S
∗ − S
1 + σ (40)
Renegotiation has not changed the gain from deviation because the gain
is realized before the renegotiation occurs. However, the loss is diﬀerent.
Joint surplus drops from S∗ to (S1 − σ) in the punishment path compared
t oad r o pf r o mS∗ to SJ without renegotiation. Accordingly renegotiation
of ownership structure softens the punishment. In the previous section the
strength of joint ownership was that it maximizes punishment. Now that the
punishment is softened11 can joint ownership ever be optimal? Lemma 4 is
the ￿rst step in providing an answer to that question.
10The agents can ￿nd a sharing rule such that neither agent has an incentive to cheat
if and only if this combined incentive compatibility constraint holds. A sharing rule ¡1
2S∗, 1
2S∗¢
gives the agents balanced incentives.
11Note that the loss from deviation is still higher under joint ownership even with
renegotiation:
¡
S∗ − S1 + σ
¢
compared to
¡
S∗ − S1¢
with a single owner.
22Lemma 4 (i)
∂e δ
J
∂σ < 0 and
∂e δ
J
∂λ > 0.
(ii) e δ
J
≥ δ
1 for σ =0 .
(iii) e δ
J
= δ
J for λ = σ =0 .
(iv) e δ
J
= δ
J for λ = λ.
Proof. (i) σ only appears in the denominator of (38), thus
∂e δ
J
∂σ < 0.
∂e δ
J
∂λ > 0
is implied by ∂S1
∂λ > 0.
(ii)F o rσ = 0 the loss is equal under joint ownership and agent 1 owner-
ship and from Proposition 2 we know that the gain is (weakly) higher under
joint ownership. Therefore e δ
J
≥ δ
1.
(iii)F o rλ =0S1 = SJ. Substituting this and σ = 0 in (38) gives:
e δ
J
=
Pd
1 + Pd
2 − S∗
P d
1 + P d
2 − SJ
which is equal to δ
J from equation (28).
(iv)B yd e ￿nition S1 (λ)=SJ + σ. Substituting this in (38) gives:
e δ
J
=
Pd
1 + Pd
2 − S∗
P d
1 + P d
2 − SJ
which is equal to δ
J from (28).
Lemma 4 states that the higher is the renegotiation cost the lower is the
critical discount factor under joint ownership. This is because the punishment
is the stronger the higher is σ. L e m m a4a l s o￿nds that e δ
J
is increasing in λ
(regardless of γ). Higher λ increases the surplus in the punishment path (as
ownership is renegotiated to agent 1 ownership) but does not have an eﬀect
on the gain from deviation. Therefore e δ
J
unambiguously increases in λ.
Lemma 4 does not give the optimal ownership structure directly as we
have to take into account the range where renegotiation does not occur.
Lemma 4 gives the critical discount factor in the renegotiation range while
when renegotiation does not occur Lemma 2 is relevant. Combining the two
gives the relevant lowerbound for the discount factor. It is to that we proceed
next and construct Figure 2.
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J and δ
1 are as in Figure 1. In addition we have drawn e δ
J
for σ > 0. Part (iii)o fL e m m a4s a y st h a te δ
J
for σ =0a n dδ
J start from
the same point and according to part (i) e δ
J
is decreasing in σ. Therefore
for σ > 0 e δ
J
at λ = 0 is below δ
J. Furthermore part (i) states that e δ
J
is
increasing in λ. There facts help us to draw e δ
J
.
Part (iv) obtains that when we move from no renegotiation range to
the range where renegotiation occurs, the relevant critical discount factor is
continuous. That is, we know that renegotiation range starts where e δ
J
cuts
the horizontal δ
J schedule. Therefore the relevant critical discount factor is
given by the bold line.
The eﬀect of the softer punishment due to renegotiation is clearly seen in
Figure 2: the critical discount factor for joint ownership is (weakly) higher.
We can now analyse the optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 6 Joint ownership is optimal
(i) for all λ > 0 if and only if γ > 2 and σ ≥ σ,
(ii) for λ ≤ λ if γ > 2 and σ < σ.
Proof. (i)D e ￿ne σ for which λ(σ)=1 . (See Lemma 3.) For σ ≥ σ
renegotiation does not occur for any λ and therefore we repeat the result of
Proposition 3.
(ii) See Figure 2(a). De￿ne λ such that δ
1
‡
λ
·
= e δ
J ‡
λ
·
. It is clear from
the ￿gure that the critical discount factor is lowest under joint ownership for
λ ≤ λ.
Proposition 7 It is optimal to have a single owner if (i) γ < 2, (ii) γ >
2,σ < σ and λ > λ, or (iii) γ =2and λ > λ.
Proof. (i) is obvious from Figure 2(b) and (ii) follows from the proof of
Proposition 6. (iii)L e m m a4 ( i)p r o v e st h a te δ
J
is increasing in λ for all γ
while Lemma 2 obtains that δ
1 = δ
J for γ =2 . Therefore whenever we are
in the renegotiation range (λ > λ) δ
1 < e δ
J
if γ =2 .
Comparing Propositions 6 and 7 to Propositions 3 to 5 in the previous
section we can conclude that taking into account renegotiation of ownership
structure makes a stronger case for the asset to have a single owner - that
24is, for the results of the static game to hold. In the previous section it
was optimal to have a single owner if and only if investment is elastic to
surplus share. In this section we additionally have single owner for inelastic
investment if σ is low and λ is high and for unit elastic investment if λ is
high. Renegotiation softens punishment under joint ownership and therefore
the parameter range for which it is optimal is smaller.
However, even with softer punishment joint ownership is optimal for a
wide parameter range. In particular, what is required for joint ownership
to be optimal is that λ is not too high. In other words the agents have to
be indispensable enough to each other for joint ownership to be optimal.
Note that joint ownership can be optimal even when renegotiation would
occur in the punishment path. In Figure 2(a) for λ ≤ λ ≤ λ we are in the
renegotiation range and e δ
J
< δ
1.
Additionally we get a stronger result that ownership does matter in the
repeated game. In the previous section ownership did not matter for unit
elastic investment while now it does matter as long as λ is high as Proposition
7 states. This is also due the softer punishment under joint ownership.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we show that joint ownership is optimal (i)w h e nt h ea g e n t s ￿
investment has low value without the other party even if they have access
to the asset and (ii) when investment is inelastic to surplus share (i.e. the
marginal cost of investment is convex). When the parties are very important
to each other mutual dependency through ownership structure supports co-
operation. The majority of all joint ventures are between domestic partners
and foreign business ￿rms. These international joint ventures often combine
the technological knowledge of the foreign ￿rm with the local knowledge of
the domestic ￿rm - neither has much value without the other. Marriage is
another form of joint ownership. Time and eﬀort invested in building and
maintaining a good relationship have indeed very little value without the
spouse even with access to the material possessions. Therefore the ￿rst con-
dition holds in these forms of joint ownership. The second condition, convex
marginal cost, can result from time constraints. Marginal cost increases at
an increasing rate as time for other activities is crowded out.
If at least one of the conditions does not hold then it is optimal to have
25a single owner. When parties are relatively unimportant to each other we
should observe a hierarchical ￿rm. In a typical hierarchical ￿rm the value
of the owner￿s speci￿c knowledge about the ￿rm￿s products and customers
is not greatly diminished when a worker leaves the ￿rm. This observation
matches with our result.
26Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : S t e p1 .We ￿rst derive δ
1.
Under Assumption 1￿ the marginal cost is γvγ−1. Inserting this is (11) we
get the ￿rst-best investment:
v
∗ =( 1 /γ)
1
(γ−1) (A.1)
From equations (16) and (17) the punishment investments with the single
owner are:
v
1
1 =[ ( 1+λ)/2γ]
1
(γ−1) (A.2)
v
1
2 =( 1 /2γ)
1
(γ−1) (A.3)
We aim to derive:
δ
1 =
G1
G1 + L1 (A.4)
Using equation (29) we obtain:
G
1 =
h
c(v
∗) − c
‡
v
1
1
·i
+
h
c(v
∗) − c
‡
v
1
2
·i
−
1
2
(1 + λ)
‡
v
∗ − v
1
1
·
−
1
2
‡
v
∗ − v
1
2
·
=( 1 /γ)(1/γ)
1
(γ−1)



h
1 − [(1 + λ)/2]
γ
(γ−1)
i
+
h
1 − [1/2]
γ
(γ−1)
i
−1
2 (1 + λ)γ
￿
1 − [(1 + λ)/2]
1
(γ−1)
¶
− 1
2γ
￿
1 − (1/2)
1
(γ−1)
¶



And from (29) and (30) we get:
G1 + L1 =
1
2
(1 − λ)
‡
v
∗ − v
1
1
·
+
1
2
‡
v
∗ − v
1
2
·
=( 1 /γ)(1/γ)
1
(γ−1)
•1
2
(1 − λ)γ
￿
1 − [(1 + λ)/2]
1
(γ−1)
¶
+
1
2
γ
￿
1 − (1/2)
1
(γ−1)
¶‚
27Now we obtain the lowerbound for the discount factor under agent 1 control:
δ
1(λ)=
{
•
1 −
‡
1+λ
2
· γ
γ−1
‚
+
•
1 −
‡
1
2
· γ
γ−1
‚
−
1+λ
2 γ
•
1 −
‡
1+λ
2
· 1
γ−1
‚
− 1
2γ
•
1 −
‡
1
2
· 1
γ−1
‚
}/
‰
1−λ
2 γ
•
1 −
‡
1+λ
2
· 1
γ−1
‚
+ 1
2γ
•
1 −
‡
1
2
· 1
γ−1
‚￿
(A.5)
We simplify notation by de￿ning ε ≡ (γ − 2) > −1a n dη ≡ (1+λ)/2. Since
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, then 1/2 ≤ η ≤ 1.
δ
1(λ)=

  
  
h
1 − η
2+ε
1+ε
i
+
•
1 −
‡
1
2
·2+ε
1+ε
‚
− η(2 + ε)
h
1 − η
1
1+ε
i
−1
2(2 + ε)
•
1 −
‡
1
2
· 1
1+ε
‚

  
  
/


(1 − η)(2 + ε)
h
1 − η
1
1+ε
i
+
1
2
(2 + ε)

1 −
￿1
2
¶ 1
1+ε




 (A.6)
Next de￿ne ν ≡ η1/(1+ε) and φ ≡ 2−1/(1+ε)
δ
1(λ)=
"
(1 − ην)+( 1− φ/2) − (2 + ε)(1− ν)η
−(2 + ε)(1− φ)/2
#
/
[(2 + ε)(1− ν)(1− η)+( 2+ε)(1− φ)/2] (A.7)
Step 2. Now we prove that δ
1(0) = δ
1(1).
For λ =0w eh a v eη =1 /2a n dν = φ. Substituting these into (A.7) we
obtain:
δ
1(0) = [2(1 − φ/2) − (2 + ε)(1− φ)]/[(2 + ε)(1− φ)] (A.8)
For λ =1w eo b t a i nη =1a n dν =1 . Substituting these into (A.24) we
have:
δ
1(1) = [(1 − φ/2) − (2 + ε)(1− φ)/2]/[(2 + ε)(1− φ)/2] (A.9)
=[ 2 ( 1 − φ/2) − (2 + ε)(1− φ)]/[(2 + ε)(1− φ)]
28This proves that δ
1(0) = δ
1(1).
Step 3. Next we derive δ
J. From Lemma 1 we know that δ
J = δ
1(0).
T h e r e f o r ew ec a nu s ee q u a t i o n( A . 8 ) .
δ
J =[ ( 1− φ/2) − (2 + ε)(1− φ)/2]/[(2 + ε)(1− φ)/2] (A.10)
Step 4. Now we derive δ in the case where both agent￿s punishment
investment is equal to
b v =[ ( 1+λ)/2γ]
1
(γ−1) (A.11)
Denote it by b δ. This does not correspond to any ownership structure but the
symmetry simpli￿es the proof greatly and we will use b δ in the next step of
the proof.
The gain and the loss from deviation are:
b G = γ
−γ
(1−γ)

1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! γ
γ−1

 −
(1 + λ)
2
γ
−1
(γ−1)

1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! 1
γ−1

 (A.12)
b L = γ
−1
(1−γ)

1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! 1
γ−1

 − γ
−γ
(γ−1)

1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! γ
γ−1

 (A.13)
Therefore the lowerbound for the discount factor is:
b δ =




1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! γ
γ−1

 −
(1 + λ)
2
γ

1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! 1
γ−1




/
(1 − λ)
2
γ

1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! 1
γ−1

 (A.14)
Diﬀerentiating (A.14) with respect to λ we obtain:
∂b δ
∂λ
s =

1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! γ
γ−1




(γ − 1) −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! 1
γ−1 "
(γ − 1) −
(1 − λ)
(1 + λ)
#


−γ

1 −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! 1
γ−1




(γ − 1) −
ˆ
1+λ
2
! 1
γ−1 "
(γ − 1) −
(1 − λ)
2
#


29We aim to prove that
∂b δ
∂λ
s =( γ − 2). To simplify notation de￿ne ε ≡ (γ − 2)
and η ≡ (1 + λ)/2. Then the previous equation simpli￿es to:
Fη(ε)=
h
1 − η
2+ε
1+ε
i(
(1 + ε) − η
1
1+ε
"
(1 + ε) −
(1 − η)
η
#)
−(2 + ε)
h
1 − η
1
1+ε
in
(1 + ε) − η
1
1+ε (1 + ε) − (1 − η)
o
(A.15)
Next de￿ne ν ≡ η
1
1+ε. Substituting ν in (A.15) and simplifying we obtain:
Fη(ε)=( 1 − νη)[(1+ε)(1− ν)+ν(1 − η)/η]
−(2 + ε)(1 − ν)[(1+ε)(1 − ν)+ν(1 − η)]
=( 1 − νη)(ν − η)/η − ε(2 + ε)(1 − ν)
2 (A.16)
From ν￿s de￿nition we have ε = {[ln(η)/ln(ν)] − 1}. Substituting this in
(A.16) gives:
Fη(ε)=( 1 − νη)(ν − η)/η −
n
[ln(η)/ln(ν)]
2 − 1
o
(1 − ν)
2
=
n
ν (1 − η)
2 − η(1 − ν)
2 [ln(η)/ln(ν)]
2o
/η
=
(1 − η)
2 (1 − ν)
2
η[ln(ν)]
2 [f(ν) − f (η)] (A.17)
where f (ν)=
ν[ln(ν)]2
(1−ν)2 . It is straightforward to show that:
−1 < ε < 0 ⇔ 0 < ν < η < 1
ε =0 ⇔ 1/2 ≤ ν = η < 1
ε > 0 ⇔ 1/2 ≤ η < ν < 1
We aim to prove that Fη(ε)
s = ε. It is easy to verify from (A.17) that
Fη(0) = 0. Furthermore Fη(ε)
s =[ f(ν) − f (η)] . Therefore f0(ν) > 0 for
ν ∈ (0,1) implies that Fη(ε)
s = ε.
f
0(ν)=
(1 + ν)[ln(ν)]
2
(1 − ν)3 +
2ln(ν)
(1 − ν)2 = k(ν)h(ν) (A.18)
30where k(ν)=[ 2 ( 1− ν)/(1 + ν)+l n ( ν)] and h(ν)=( 1+ν)ln(ν)/(1 − ν)3.
h(ν) < 0f o rν ∈(0,1). k(1) = 0 and k0(ν)=( 1− ν)2/ν(1 + ν)2 > 0a n d
therefore k(ν) < 0 for ν ∈ (0,1). Accordingly f0(ν)=h(ν)k(ν) > 0 for
ν ∈(0,1). This completes the proof that
∂b δ
∂λ
s =( γ − 2).
Step 5. Finally we prove that δ
1(λ)−δ
J s = ε for 0 < λ < 1. We start by
solving:
δ
1(λ) − δ
J =
(1 − ην)+( 1− φ/2) − η(2 + ε)(1− ν) − (2 + ε)(1− φ)/2
(1 − η)(2+ε)(1− ν)+( 2+ε)(1− φ)/2
−
(1 − φ/2) − (2 + ε)(1− φ)/2
(2 + ε)(1− φ)/2
s =( 1− ην)(1− φ) − 2(1 − η)(1− ν)(1− φ/2)
+(1− 2η)(2+ε)(1− ν)(1− φ) (A.19)
Next we obtain:
b δ − δ
1(λ)=
(1 − ην) − η(2 + ε)(1− ν)
(1 − η)(2+ε)(1− ν)
−
(1 − ην)+( 1− φ/2) − η(2 + ε)(1− ν)
(1 − η)(2+ε)(1− ν)+( 2+ε)(1− φ)/2
+
(2 + ε)(1− φ)/2
(1 − η)(2+ε)(1− ν)+( 2+ε)(1− φ)/2
s =( 1− ην)(1− φ) − 2(1 − η)(1− ν)(1− φ/2)
+(1− 2η)(2+ε)(1− ν)(1− φ) (A.20)
This proves that b δ − δ
1(λ)
s = δ
1(λ) − δ
J. Therefore one of the following
has to be true:
(i) b δ < δ
1(λ) < δ
J
(ii) b δ = δ
1(λ)=δ
J
(iii) b δ > δ
1(λ) > δ
J
b δ(0) = δ
J and from step 4 of the proof we know that ∂b δ/∂λ
s = ε. Therefore
for λ = 0 and/or ε=0b δ = δ
J and (ii) holds. For λ ∈ (0,1) and ε < 0 b δ < δ
J
and therefore (i) holds. Respectively for λ ∈ (0,1) and ε > 0 b δ > δ
J and (iii)
holds.
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